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Choosing Law and Giving Justice*
Louise Weinberg"
The doctors have a prime directive: "At least do no harm." Medical science
cannot always restore health, but at least physicians can try not to make things
worse. Judges probably could use a prime directive too: "At least do no injustice."
Courts cannot right every wrong, but at least judges can try not to make things
worse.
Judges, however, come up against a paradox when they try to avoid an unjust
outcome in a case. This paradox is especially poignant in cases presenting
multistate problems. Judges doing a commendable job of choosing law to govern
a multistate problem-commendable by our"modem" lights-may find themselves
in a position in which it is very difficult not to do an injustice. In most states of this
Union, and in many countries, judges today try to choose law based on the
connection between the sovereign whose law is sought to be applied and the
problem before the court. This connection-set of contacts-nexus-has become
all important to a choice of law. The appeal of this modem theory is an appeal to
reasonableness. To most of us, the more connections an event may have with, say,
Barataria, the more reasonable it will seem to let Barataria law govern the
consequences of that event. And the fewer connections between Barataria and the
case, the more unreasonable becomes its governance.
We are right to think such governance unreasonable. When law is
irrelevant it falls into the common lawyers' category of "arbitrary and
irrational." In the United States irrelevant law is not only arbitrary and
irrational, it is unconstitutional. Law irrelevant to the parties' case cannot
be "due process." Thus, if an irrelevant law is the only law that could avoid
injustice, legal theory and constitutional principle combine to tell us that judges
must do the "reasonable" thing even if it means an "unjust" result. There you have
the paradox.
Justice versus principle. This paradox is like the teasing puzzles of childhood
that have no known solution. But unlike those puzzles, the choice-of-law paradox
is painful. Injustice causes human suffering. The consequence for legal theory has
been a great, impassioned debate. It has gone on for decades, perhaps centuries.
On one side are those who see clearly that law without justice is insupportable. On
the other are those who see equally clearly that justice without law is insupportable.
These are two main schools of legal thought. Both, of course, are right. This has
been the great crisis of legal theory in our field. It has also been a crisis in other
fields, notably in constitutional interpretation. It is a fundamental problem of
jurisprudence.
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And yet all of this is very academic. Judges have known for a long time how
to reason in a justice-seeking way. Most good judges can do this without any
sacrifice of principle or reasonableness. They let academics like us hammer away
at each other and they pay very little attention to us. There is nothing unfamiliar
about judicial processes that are justice-seeking. Consider, for a moment, that a
court in a state that is relevant to the problem before it can always reasonably apply
its own law. If that law seems unjust on the facts, with or without a multistate
setting, a judge will have a look at what is going on in other courts. Ifjudges find
that they prefer a rule that Barataria judges use, they say so. For their purposes it
does not matter that Barataria may have zero connection with the case before them.
The reason it does not matter is that they are not "choosing" Baratarian law.
Rather, they are adopting a rule of law as their own, for cases on these particular
facts.
It does happen that there may be a fixed statutory substantive command to the
contrary by the forum's own legislature. But even then good judges, of course, try
to construe the legislation so as not to work an injustice. This is a familiar canon
of judicial process in domestic cases and is hardly forgotten in multistate ones. If
necessary a good judge will even carve out a nonstatutory exception to the
legislation. In such tasks, too, a judge is much assisted by surveying the work of
other courts that have dealt with similar legislation on similar facts.
It is now a near-universal problem that courts hold themselves bound to labor
under some fixed method of choice of law. The tedious formulaic recitals in the
judicial opinions of the late twentieth century became longer than the analyses
actually applying the formulas. Yet even the best of formulas cannot guarantee just
results. A directive, let us say, to choose the best law available, could not compare
in efficacy to the everyday normal practices of a justice-rendering court. That is
because the possibility of an unjust application of law is not, in the nature of the
thing, usually foreseeable to the original lawmaker. If it were, presumably the
lawmaker would have created the necessary exception without waiting for the
judges to do it.
Sometimes there are only two states with relevant laws: the forum, and
perhaps one other state--let us call it Caledonia. It might turn out that the laws of
both states, alas, are unsatisfactory in the particular case. It would be helpful,
however, if lawyers noted the existence of better law elsewhere. Judges, too, are
allowed to visit their own libraries. Even eschewing the arts of construction and
interpretation, even refraining from fashioning or adopting better law, courts can
nevertheless say, "Nor do we agree that on these facts Caledonia would apply its
current law. The great weight of authority increasingly takes the Barataria position.
We think that, on the question before us, Caledonia would adopt the Barataria rule."
In the twentieth century it became fashionable to deride such judicial
maneuvers as "escape devices." But it is not clear why devising an escape from
injustice is to be derided. The best theorists of law in the twentieth century, the
American Legal Realists, taught us, after all, that much judicial reasoning is only
attempted justification of a predetermined result. They should have seen that this
is true of all judicial reasoning, the best as well as the worst. They should have seen
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that ifjudicial reasoning does in fact become persuasive, it makes no difference that
its author sought to justify a predetermined result.
Sometimes, fearing the risk of injustice inherent in rigid rules of choice of law,
the better twentieth century conflicts theorists advised courts to choose law that
would advance the policies underlying the particular laws sought to be applied.
Today that advice is hard to follow. What if the policy underlying the legislation
in question is to protect the wrongdoer at the expense of the injured? To be sure,
legislatures have good and sufficient reasons to protect gainful enterprises from
liability to some extent, whatever harms those enterprises may cause. The policy
underlying tort reform legislation, in whole or in part, is protection, rather than
regulation, of enterprise; some risk, rather than remediation, of harms. Of course
when such legislation cannot be struck down as unconstitutional-much of it
is-tort reforms must be, and are, respected. But exigent justice often finds ways
to triumph anyway, the kinds of canonical ways we have been talking about. Of
course courts must defer to legislation. But courts also must dispense justice,
sometimes even in the teeth of legislation. Choosing law, or adopting new law, or
construing and interpreting existing law, will usually give judges legitimate ways
of ruling by their best lights.
The deeper question, of course, is, "What is justice?" We can complain, quite
accurately, that the judges are simply setting their views ofjustice against those of
our elected representatives. But we can also acknowledge that the policies
underlying judge-made law are, time out of mind, compensatory and deterrent, and
that, in courts, this is what justice is. We can also acknowledge that narrow
interpretations of law or choices of other law are the traditional paths by which
independent courts open dialogue with legislatures or with other courts. Such
judicial rulings remain open to legislative revision and overrulings. These rulings
must withstand the test of time: And so these sorts of rulings sometimes are
constructive on a broader scale than the individual case. There are many familiar
stories of repeal of substandard law by legislatures that have learned that courts
both abroad and at home will not enforce it.
The moral of the story seems to be that in the twenty-first century we conflicts
theorists could benefit from a prime directive of our own (we could share it with
compulsive gamblers): "At least swear by no system." I fear that it is too late to
persuade judges that they need not resort to one or another of our elaborate, now-
quaint twentieth century choice-of-law "methods." Would that they could treat
conflicts cases just the way they treat domestic ones, using traditional canons of
construction and interpretation. At bottom, that is what the greatest of the twentieth
century writers in the conflicts field taught. Perhaps I am too optimistic, but I have
the temerity to believe that American judges, even in conflicts cases, even weighed
down as they now are with methodological baggage, will go on finding ways to get
on with their real work.
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